


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


7 February 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR: The assignment of Averky Aristov, a full member of the party presidium since 1957, as ambassador to Poland deprives him of a place in the Kremlin inner circle. Although still formally a member of the presidium, Aristov has lost his key post as Khrushchev's deputy in the central committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic (RSFSR), which

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supervises party affairs in the USSR's largest republic. Compared with some other Soviet republics, the RSFSR had a satisfactory agricultural year in 1960 and there has been no indication of executive failures on Aristov's part. His demotion appears to be the outcome of a competition for authority among Khrushchev's lieutenants. His removal from the RSFSR post, in which he has been replaced by a newcomer to the central command, appears likely both to strengthen the grip of Frol Kozlov, as Khrushchev's principal party aide on the RSFSR party organization and to enhance the position of Dmitry Polyansky, the RSFSR premier.

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Congo: Britain, France, and Belgium have now expressed reservations concerning Hammarskjold's recent proposals that the Congolese Army be neutralized. The British believe that the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would be undermined if the troops in the Leopoldville area were disarmed. French and Belgian representatives have also stated that the proposal would be

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[] [] detrimental to Kasavubu's legal position, and might result in the early restoration to power of Lumumba. []

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Burma: [] General Ne Win appears to have staved off a potential challenge to his control of the Burmese Army. On 3 February, he reportedly accepted the resignation of Brigadier Maung Maung, as well as the resignations of several other senior officers, and ordered five of Burma's 13 brigade commanders to attaché posts abroad. These actions would eliminate those who have argued most strongly for a resumption of military government and against Prime Minister Nu's policy of rapprochement with Peiping. []

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Iran: [] The Shah is reported to be discouraged by election difficulties, problems in Iranian-Soviet relations, and uncertainty over future American policy toward Iran. [] The fear of resurgent nationalists has led him to impose almost complete control over the current parliamentary elections. This in turn has brought an increase in antiregime activity of nationalist groups. [] While the Shah has given earlier assurances to the United States that he would not make any significant political concessions to the USSR, he has instructed his prime minister not to be "totally antagonistic" toward the USSR but to find out what the Soviet Union would be willing to do for Iran. []

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DAILY BRIEF

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Western Europe: De Gaulle, Adenauer, and the four other heads of government of the European Common Market countries are due to meet in Paris on 10 February to discuss De Gaulle's plan for a six-nation European "confederation," and other measures proposed to strengthen Western European unity. Avowed opposition to the De Gaulle proposals has abated in the last six months, although there is still concern over De Gaulle's suspected desire to establish a French-led continent as the basis for advancing French national interests. A preliminary Adenauer - De Gaulle meeting is scheduled for 9 February.

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Brazil: President Quadros has ordered his foreign minister to take immediate steps toward establishing diplomatic relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria; to cancel the credentials of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian diplomatic representatives, and to initiate an evaluation of Brazil's present relations with Taiwan. Quadros was probably motivated partly by a desire to assert his government's independence in foreign affairs and partly by a desire to conciliate leftist-nationalist groups in anticipation of their dissatisfaction with "harsh" economic recovery measures that may follow. Negotiations with the USSR may also be under way, as reportedly stated by a member of the Chamber of Deputies on 3 February. Brazil has long had diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland.

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DAILY BRIEF

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Soviet Party Leader Demoted

Averky Aristov as early as October 1952 had worked his way into the inner party circle around Stalin, but he lost out in the shake-up in March 1953 following Stalin's death and was exiled to a remote provincial post. He was recalled to Moscow in 1955 as a party secretary and in June 1957, when Khrushchev won his victory over Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, was again made a member of the ruling party presidium. By December 1958 he had become Khrushchev's only deputy on the important party Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian Republic), which supervises party affairs in the Soviet Union's largest republic. In the May 1960 reshuffle of the Soviet top leadership Aristov, in what now appears to have been a prelude to his current demotion, was relieved as party secretary "to devote full time to his duties as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau."

Aristov continued active in RSFSR affairs through last fall, and the RSFSR was credited at the recent party central committee plenum with relative success in the agricultural field as compared with other republics. There have been no signs of dissatisfaction with his work on the RSFSR Bureau.

His demotion to the post of ambassador in Warsaw appears to be the outcome of competition among Khrushchev's lieutenants. The removal of Aristov from Moscow appears to strengthen the authority of party secretary Frol Kozlov, apparently marked to succeed Khrushchev in the event of the latter's death or disability, and to give RSFSR Premier Dmitry Polyansky a dominant voice in that republic's affairs. Polyansky has been increasingly in the public eye, visiting the provinces and acting as principal spokesman for the republic, and he may have resented sharing authority with Aristov.

Gennady Voronov, one of the new candidate members elected to the party presidium at the central committee plenum in January, replaced Aristov as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau. As a newcomer, he probably will be in no position to challenge Polyansky's authority in the RSFSR.

Petr Abrasimov, who had been ambassador to Warsaw since September 1957, was recalled last week. On his farewell visit he told US Ambassador Beam that he was returning to a ministerial job or to "party work," and added that his successor had not been chosen.

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Congo Situation

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[A British Foreign Office official has indicated that Britain has some reservations concerning the recent United States initiative in the Congo. The American Embassy in London believes that the British will ask for a further review of the proposals before they are willing to support them. Representatives of the French and Belgian governments have also raised questions concerning the plan.]

[The British believe that the military situation in the Congo currently favors Kasavubu and that his position would be compromised by a neutralization of the Congolese forces, as the United States plan suggests. Moreover, they question whether Kasavubu will accept the plan and doubt that many UN members would be willing to make the necessary sacrifices to carry it out if it is accepted. They reportedly favor a more gradual approach to the problem, waiting to bring forward the proposals at least until the end of February, when the UN's conciliation commission is scheduled to publish its report. The commission, which is now completing its investigations in the Congo, is expected to make a report generally favorable to Kasavubu and the moderates.]

[Nehru, in a conversation with the US ambassador in New Delhi, welcomed the new plan and expressed complete agreement with many of its elements. He reiterated, however, his belief that political prisoners, including Lumumba, should be released earlier than new proposals envisage.]

Meanwhile, Mobutu appears to be planning a military operation against Gizenga's forces. He stated recently that he had reports of disaffection among Gizenga's troops in eastern Kivu Province and that he was ready to move into the area in the near future. Preparations for the move apparently are being made with the assistance of Mobutu's Belgian military advisers. However, any operation will be hampered by logistics difficulties and by the unreliability of Mobutu's troops.

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Burmese Army Shake-up

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[In his purge of senior officers in the Burmese Army, Ne Win considered the advantages accruing to Burma through the Sino-Burmese border demarcation to outweigh the liabilities imposed by Nu's ineffectual administration and rapprochement with Peiping. Some of these officers were his strongest supporters during his 18-month military government. Brigadier Aung Shwe, commander of the southern military region, is one of Ne Win's protégés and has been considered a counterweight to the political and military ambitions of Deputy Chief of Staff Brigadier Aung Gyi. Colonel Tun Sein, although not considered a policy maker, has been one of Burma's most effective field commanders and administrators. Brigadier Maung Maung, whose resignation was announced earlier, has been one of Ne Win's closest advisers. All others ousted have held responsible army commands.]

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[Ne Win's army shake-up does not rule out the possibility of an eventual military move against U Nu. Ne Win's patience with the civilian government has been reported wearing thin and, when the border demarcation is completed, he may actually oust Nu. He probably would not take such action, however, unless he was convinced of popular support for the move.]

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Iran May Improve Relations With USSR

[The Shah feels that there has been some change in Soviet policy toward Iran and that Tehran now should take a more moderate attitude toward the USSR. Prime Minister Sharif-Emami will head a good-will mission to Moscow, probably in April. The Shah has been anxious to end the barrage of hostile Soviet propaganda which, after a four-month lull, has intensified in recent weeks. The propaganda, keyed to corruption in the current Iranian parliamentary elections, probably has found a wide and sympathetic audience in urban areas.]

[Nationalist groups, long quiet, have made a display of strength in protest against the rigged elections. Progovernment groups, on the other hand, have attracted little popular interest. Antigovernment demonstrations by students drew large crowds at the university in Tehran, and on 5 February the students succeeded in closing the bazaar. Classes have now been suspended at the university. Demonstrations are drawing fewer participants in the face of strong, but so far apparently bloodless, police action.]

[The government's official line is that the nationalist activity is Communist inspired. The extent of Communist participation is unclear, but the more extreme nationalists are probably cooperating with local Communists. Sharif-Emami has deplored the fact that extremist elements gained the upper hand and that the moderates, whom he was encouraging, refused to take any part in the elections. He hopes to be able to control nationalist activity by normal police methods, but the Shah has ordered the army to take action if the police appear to be wavering. The army, untrained in riot control, might unwittingly precipitate a clash that would give the nationalists martyrs for their cause.]

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[De Gaulle's plan for a European "confederation" was first advanced to Adenauer in mid-1960 and has been the subject of numerous bilateral exchanges since. The plan has never been committed to writing, but in general it calls for the establishment of ministerial-level committees to promote six-nation cooperation in political, cultural, economic, and defense affairs, probably to be serviced by a permanent political secretariat. In addition, there would be periodic meetings of heads of governments.]

[When initially proposed, the plan evoked strong opposition from most of the other EEC countries, partly on the grounds that it would weaken the supranational powers of existing European Community institutions and would involve a major departure from the eventual goal of a federally organized Europe. This opposition has moderated considerably in recent months, however, partly because of apparent assurances from De Gaulle that the EEC would not be weakened, and partly because even ardent federalists like Jean Monnet have come to feel that confederation is at present the only feasible approach to political unity. Others evidently also feel that if the Six accepts parts of De Gaulle's plan, he might be persuaded to agree to simultaneous steps to strengthen Community institutions.]

[Continuing opposition was demonstrated, however, in a Dutch request on 31 January that the US issue a "strong statement" prior to the 10 February meeting in "support of NATO." The Dutch expect De Gaulle to argue that the US will "inevitably leave the Continent" and will accordingly press for "formalization of political consultations among the Six"--which, the Dutch feel, will be "divisive in NATO."]

[The 10 February meeting was initially scheduled for 5 December but postponed because of Adenauer's illness. The private meeting between Adenauer and De Gaulle on the preceding day is expected to set the tone of the plenary talks, and the Dutch believe Adenauer will join in urging definite action at the 10 February session. While there is doubt]

that concrete decisions will be reached, the concept of frequent top-level meetings of the Six may be endorsed and some kind of committee set up to prepare a detailed agreement. From this could emerge serious discussions of various approaches to closer political ties in the Community to match the degree of economic integration which is rapidly being achieved.

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Brazilian President Orders Expansion of Relations With Soviet Bloc

During his election campaign Brazilian President Janio Quadros promised to expand trade and diplomatic relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Brazil maintains diplomatic relations only with Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose legations were raised to embassies shortly before President Kubitschek's term expired. In his acceptance speech on 31 January, Foreign Minister Arinos stated that Brazil intends to "establish diplomatic and commercial relations with all states of the world that desire pacific interchange with us, with respect for our juridical and social organization. . . . This orientation cannot and ought not to be interpreted as directed against anyone."

There has been growing speculation that Brazil would renew diplomatic relations with the USSR--which Brazil broke in 1947. Vice President Goulart may have discussed the matter when he visited Moscow unofficially in December 1960. Direct trade with the USSR was initiated last year after the two countries signed a trade agreement in December 1959. Trade with the Soviet bloc amounted to 4 percent of Brazil's total trade in 1959 and by 31 August 1960 had reached 5.3 percent. Former President Kubitschek's development program attracted considerable interest within the bloc, and the eventual fulfillment of outstanding contracts for industrial and other goods may increase bloc participation in Brazil's trade.

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